MCP

What crosses the MCP boundary

A third-party client sees tool schemas and mission summaries. It never sees the server address, your keys, or your data room — and everything it triggers runs on your machine.

AVAILABLEWritten and covered by tests — not yet observed in a live runFinexia · published · updated · 5 sources · Finexia OS 0.0.30

Shipped in the current build. You can do this on your own machine today.

Connecting a client to Finexia adds a party to the conversation, and the useful question is not “is it secure” but “what does that party get to see”. Below, per link in the chain.

#Everything runs on your machine

  • The client launches the server as a subprocess, on your machine. That is what the stdio transport is: no port, no network listener, no address to reach from outside 3.
  • The server hands the request to the running application over a local Unix socket — a file on your disk, not a network endpoint.
  • The application runs the mandates, drives the vendor CLIs you signed into, and writes into your data room. Nothing about that changes because the request came from a client instead of the window.
  • The server writes only protocol messages on standard output and keeps its logs on standard error, as the transport requires. A stray line on the wrong stream breaks a session; a test holds it.

#What reaches the model, and what never does

ThingReaches the model?Why
Tool names, descriptions and input schemasYesThat is how a model knows what it may call. They are written to be read by one.
Mission summaries, sizes, digests, source listsYesThey are the answer to a call the model made.
The internal MCP server addressNoA test asserts that no schema carries it. A client has no business reaching the card server.
Vendor keys and connector tokensNoThey live in the macOS keychain and are never composed into a prompt.
The bytes of a produced fileNoAn artifact returns a summary and a resource URI. The client reads the file if it wants to.
Your journal, your deposits, your thesesNoThey are reachable by mandates holding the capability, inside the application — not by the external surface.

#Roles and capabilities still decide

A request arriving over MCP does not bypass anything. The mission is routed to mandates, and each mandate reaches only what its declared capabilities cover — the same table that stops the application from opening if a role ever combines reading your data with reaching outward. A client can ask; it cannot widen.

Provenance behaves the same way. A tool that reports a source writes it to the journal with its address, its period, its metric and the date it was read, and any secret embedded in that address is redacted on the way in.

#Local MCP and a remote connector are not the same thing

  • CLIENT-VERIFIEDLocal server, launched by your clientProven on 2026-09-10 with Claude Code 2.1.265. The process runs as you, on your machine, and reaches the app over a local socket.
  • PLANNEDA remote connector pointed at your machineImpossible by construction rather than unimplemented: a custom connector’s connection starts from the vendor’s servers, not from your network, so a loopback address is not something it can reach 5.
  • PLANNEDA hosted Finexia endpointIt would need a public endpoint implementing the current transport — a single POST path, origin validation on every request 4 — plus a delegated sign-in flow. None of it is written, and hosting a desk would reverse the rule the product is built on.

#The path of a call

Five links, and every one of them is on your machine. Read it as a list: that is what it is, and a picture of it would say less.

  1. 01Your MCP clientOn your machineLaunches the Finexia binary as a subprocess and speaks JSON-RPC on its standard input and output. No port, no listener, nothing reachable from outside.
  2. 02The stdio serverA subprocess, running as youNegotiates the protocol revision, answers discovery, and forwards a call. Protocol messages on standard output, logs on standard error.
  3. 03A local Unix socketA file on your diskCarries the request to the running application. Not a network endpoint — nothing off the machine can address it.
  4. 04The Finexia applicationWhere the desk livesRoutes the request to mandates, each reaching only what its declared capabilities cover. The provider CLIs it drives are the ones you signed into.
  5. 05The answerBack the same waySummaries, sizes, digests and resource addresses. Never the bytes of a file, never a key, never the address of the internal tool server.

#Sources

  1. Finexia OS — product state at 0.0.24, providers and MCPFinexiainternal handover report · Finexia OS 0.0.24 · commit produit fb53f44 · lu à d01b336 · published 2026-09-10 · read 2026-09-10Internal document, not published
  2. The external MCP surface, mirrored on this siteFinexiainternal registry · mirror of mcp::externe — tools, prompts, resource templates, spoken revisions · read 2026-09-10Internal document, not published
  3. Model Context Protocol — stdio transportModel Context Protocol projectofficial documentation · revision 2026-07-28 · published 2026-07-28 · read 2026-09-10https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/transports/stdio
  4. Model Context Protocol — Streamable HTTP transportModel Context Protocol projectofficial documentation · revision 2026-07-28 · published 2026-07-28 · read 2026-09-10https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/transports/streamable-http
  5. Get started with custom connectors using remote MCPAnthropicofficial documentation · read 2026-09-10https://support.claude.com/en/articles/11175166-getting-started-with-custom-connectors-using-remote-mcp